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A classical problem in decision theory under uncertainty is to rank a set of acts deﬁned on
a state space S. The standard approach is to axiomatize a preference relation representable
by means of a functional, which is in turn used as a convenient tool to construct a consistent
ranking. These axiomatizations take the state space S as a primitive. However, there exist
natural situations where the agent may wish to consider a larger state space Ω in order to
rank the acts over S. Consider the following example.
Julia is looking at several alternative long-term investments for her retirement. She
wishes to maximize the probability to raise enough money to meet her future needs. Let
f and β represent the money raised by an investment and the amount needed by Julia,
respectively. At this time, both are uncertain quantities that we can view as acts. The
payoﬀ f depends on events such as the business cycle, or the rate of technological innovation;
hence, the natural state space S for the investments should list these economic variables.
The sum β that Julia is going to need at retirement depends also on noneconomic variables
such as her health conditions or the age of her descendants, which are unlikely to be listed
in S. Therefore, if Julia wishes to rank an investment by the probability P(f ≥ β) that it
meets her retirements needs, she needs to expand the set S to a larger set Ω.
This example illustrates the following general ranking procedure. Given a set F of acts
on a state space S, construct a benchmark β deﬁned on a larger set Ω and a probability
measure P on Ω. Then, rank an act f in F by the probability P(f ≥ β) that it outperforms
the benchmark. We call this procedure benchmarking, in analogy with the practice to
measure a rival’s product by a set of speciﬁed standards and compare it with one’s own
product. Throughout this paper, benchmarking denotes an evaluation procedure that ranks
a set of options by the probability that they meet a given target. See Bordley (2002). The
benchmarking procedure is more general than it may appear: we show in Section 3.2 that
it includes standard expected utility as a special case.
Of course, one can apply the existing axiomatizations for preference representation to
the benchmarking procedure simply by expanding the primitive state space to Ω. This is a
natural move and, in a well-known discussion about small worlds, Savage (1954) recommends
that the state space be taken as large as needed to include all relevant events. However,
this approach has two serious shortcomings. It increases the complexity of the decision
problem, because it expands the set of acts that needs to be ranked. And it forces the
agent to express preferences over imaginary acts, such as — in Julia’s example — long-term
investments whose payoﬀ depends on the recipient’s health conditions. Sometimes, it may
be desirable to keep the domain of the acts as small as possible.
The purpose of this paper is to characterize the benchmarking procedure when acts are
1deﬁned only on the smaller state space S. Technically, the problem is to simultaneously
construct a benchmark β and a probability measure P such that a preference relation 
on F is represented by the functional V (f) = P(f ≥ β). We solve this problem under the
structural assumption that the benchmark is deﬁned on a distinct state space S0 and that
Ω = S × S0.
Assuming that the space Ω is a cartesian product requires that the events aﬀecting the
benchmark β are diﬀerent from those aﬀecting the available acts in F; i.e., the acts and the
benchmark should be logically separate. In Julia’s example, for instance, this would imply
that the economic variables associated with S are not relevant to determine the amount β
she needs at retirement. This separability seems a natural assumption when we are given
information only about preferences over acts deﬁned on S and we do not learn anything
substantial on the domain of β. Moreover, this logical separability between the state spaces
S and S0 implies no a priori restrictions for the probability measure P on their cartesian
product Ω = S×S0. In particular, the benchmark β and the acts in F may exhibit stochastic
dependence in general.
Under the structural assumption Ω = S ×S0, the benchmarking procedure turns out to
be closely related to the additively decomposable representation known as state-dependent
expected utility. When the state space S is ﬁnite, axiomatizations of this representation
are well-known; see Debreu (1960) and Gorman (1968). Recently, Wakker and Zank (1999)
have shown how to extend the representation to the case where S is not ﬁnite. Assuming
the supnorm continuity of preferences, they prove the existence of a representing functional
for all bounded measurable acts, but derive an explicit representation only over simple acts.
Instead, the benchmarking approach generates an explicit representation for all bounded
measurable acts. In this respect, another contribution of the paper is to oﬀer a single
comprehensive representation for diﬀerent classes of additively decomposable preferences. In
particular, one of these corresponds to the special case of standard (i.e., state-independent)
expected utility.
From a technical point of view, this paper relies heavily on an approach that derives
representation theorems by measuring sets associated with functions. This idea appeared
ﬁrst in Segal (1989). He suggested to evaluate the distribution functions of real-valued
random variables by a measure deﬁned over their epigraphs and dubbed this as the “measure
representation” approach. A few papers followed in this vein until Wakker (1993) pointed
out an error in the statement of the representation theorem, which was amended in Segal
(1993). Subsequently, a few papers have extended the measure representation approach
to diﬀerent environments. LiCalzi (1998) applies it to real-valued functions of bounded
variation and Chateauneuf (1999) to probability distributions over a connected compact
space. The papers closest to ours are Chew and Wakker (1996) and especially Wakker
2and Zank (1999), which generalize the axiomatics underlying the measure representation
approach from probability distributions to acts. These two papers cast their results in a
functional language; therefore, properly speaking, they do not interpret their representing
functionals as measures on some collection of sets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 collects notation and preliminaries. Sec-
tion 3 characterizes the benchmarking procedure for a ﬁnite state space. In particular,
Section 3.2 characterizes the special case in which the benchmarking procedure is equiva-
lent to the standard expected utility model. Section 4 extends the characterizations to the
case where the state space is not ﬁnite. Herein, three diﬀerent results record the subtle
inﬂuence of increasingly stronger assumptions on the continuity of the preference relation.
Appendix A gives additional background on the extensions of measures. Appendix B col-
lects all proofs.
2 Setup and notation
2.1 Measure-theoretic preliminaries
We are interested in families of sets with diﬀerent closure properties. An algebra A on a set
S is a nonempty collection of subsets of S that is closed under complementation and ﬁnite
unions; clearly, an algebra on S includes S itself. A σ-algebra σA on S is an algebra that
is closed under countable unions.
The notion of algebra admits two distinct generalizations. A semialgebra S on S is
a collection of subsets of S that includes S and the empty set ∅, is closed under ﬁnite
intersections, and for any A,B ∈ S contains pairwise disjoint sets C1,...,Cn such that
A \ B =
Sn
i=1 Ci. A lattice L on S is a collection of subsets of S that includes S and is
closed under ﬁnite unions and ﬁnite intersections.
If S1 and S2 are two semialgebras on S1 and S2 respectively, the family of rectangles
{A × B : A ∈ S1,B ∈ S2} is a semialgebra of subsets on S1 ×S2 called the product semial-
gebra. The product semialgebra is denoted by S1×S2. Even if S1 and S2 are σ-algebras, the
product semialgebra S1×S2 need not be an algebra. The smallest algebra and, respectively,
σ-algebra generated by the product semialgebra S1 × S2 are denoted by A(S1 × S2) and
σA(S1 × S2).
Given an arbitrary collection C of subsets of S, consider a real-valued set function m
on C. We say that m is grounded if ∅ ∈ C and m(∅) = 0. It is positive if m(A) ≥ 0
for all A in C. It is additive if for each pair A,B of disjoint sets in C with A ∪ B in C,





i=1 m(Ai) holds for any sequence {Ai} of pairwise disjoint sets. We say
that m is ﬁnitely additive when it is additive but not necessarily countably additive. Finally,
3a grounded set function m is strongly additive if for each pair A,B in C with A ∩ B and
A ∪ B in C, we have m(A) + m(B) = m(A ∩ B) + m(A ∪ B).
A real-valued set function m over a semialgebra S on S is a ﬁnitely (or countably) additive
measure if it is grounded, positive, and ﬁnitely (or countably) additive. The deﬁnition
obviously extends to algebras or σ-algebras. We call (σ-)measurable space any pair (S,Σ)
where S is a set and Σ is a (σ-)algebra on S. A ﬁnitely (or countably) additive measure over
a measurable space (S,Σ) such that m(S) = 1 is called a ﬁnitely (or countably) additive
probability measure on S. Finitely additive probability measures are also known as charges.
A ﬁnitely additive measure m on a measurable space (S,Σ) is nonatomic if, for each subset
A in Σ and each strictly positive x < m(A), there exists another subset B in Σ such that
B ⊆ A and m(B) = x.
2.2 Decision-theoretic preliminaries
We consider a variant of the framework in Savage (1954). There is a state space So, which
can be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. (The superscript is a mnemonic for “overt” because this state space
is a primitive of the model, and thus its description must be explicit.) It is endowed with
an algebra Σo of subsets which we call events. Therefore, (So,Σo) is a measurable space.
The outcome space X is a compact interval [a,b] of R with nonempty interior. An act is
a measurable function f : So → X and F denotes the set of all acts. All elements of F
inherit from X the property of being bounded. An act is simple if it takes only ﬁnitely
many values and Fs denotes the set of simple acts. Under the usual abuse of notation, we
identify X with the subset of constant acts in F.
A preference relation is a binary relation  on F. As customary, we denote by ∼ and 
its symmetric and asymmetric components. A functional V : F → R represents  whenever
V (f) ≥ V (g) if and only if f  g. A necessary condition for  to have a representation
is that it is a weak order; i.e., a complete and transitive relation. A binary relation  is
nontrivial if f  g for some f,g in F; it is monotone if f(s) ≥ g(s) for every s in So implies
f  g. Whenever V represents , both of these properties transfer to V .
Given two acts f and g and an event A, let fAg denote the act which agrees with f on
A and with g on Ac. The restriction of an act f to an event A is denoted by fA. An event
A is null if fAg ∼ g for all simple acts f and g; an event which is not null is essential. A
preference relation  is strictly monotone if xAf  yAf for all nonnull events A, simple
acts f and outcomes x > y. The preference relation  satisﬁes Savage’s sure-thing principle
whenever fAh  gAh if and only if fAh0  gAh0 for all acts f,g,h,h0 and events A. When
this condition is imposed only on simple acts, we say that the sure-thing principle holds on
Fs.
43 Benchmarking over a ﬁnite state space
We aim to provide a behavioral characterization of the benchmarking procedure for acts
deﬁned on a measurable space (So,Σo). That is, we want to derive a set of axioms for a
preference relation  on a set of acts such that f  g if and only if P(f ≥ β) ≥ P(g ≥ β),
where P is a probability measure and β is a benchmark. We assume that the benchmark β is
deﬁned on a distinct measurable space (Sc,Σc). The superscript is a mnemonic for “covert”
because this state space is not a primitive of the model: its existence is endogenously derived
as part of the representation.
Formally, we derive simultaneously the existence of a benchmark β on Sc and a prob-
ability measure P on the space Ω = So × Sc such that a given preference relation  on F
is represented by the functional V (f) = P(f ≥ β). This section studies the case where the
(overt) state space So is ﬁnite. This is the natural setting for most applications in decision
analysis, where the benchmarking procedure provides a useful language for structuring an
agent’s ranking. The representation results for a ﬁnite state space obtain also as corollaries
of our results for a general state space, but a separate presentation helps to make explicit
the diﬀerent strategy of proof and the technical hurdles associated with a general state
space.
3.1 General benchmarking
Throughout this section, we assume that So = {s1,...,si,...,sn} is a ﬁnite set. Then
all acts are simple and F = Fs; moreover, we can identify F with the subset [a,b]n of
Rn. We say that the preference relation  is continuous if, for each act f, the upper level
set {g : g  f} and the lower level set {g : f  g} are closed subsets of Rn in the
Euclidean topology. The following result states that, under mild technical assumptions,
a benchmarking representation is possible if and only if preferences satisfy the sure-thing
principle. The main technical assumption is that So has at least three essential states;
note that the case where So has exactly one essential state is trivial, because there is no
uncertainty. The case with only two states requires an additional technical condition over
preferences such as the “hexagon condition”; see Karni and Safra (1998).
Theorem 1 Suppose that So = {s1,...,si,...,sn} has at least three essential states. Then
the following three statements are equivalent.
(i) The weak order  is strictly monotone, continuous, and satisﬁes the sure-thing principle.
(ii) There exist continuous functions Ui : X → [0,1] for i = 1,...,n that are strictly






(iii) There exist a (covert) measurable space (Sc,Σc), a ﬁnitely additive probability measure
P over the algebra A(Σo ×Σc) on So ×Sc, and an injective benchmark β : Sc → [a,b], such
that  is represented by
V (f) = P(f ≥ β).
Moreover, the marginal probability measure Po on So induced by P has Po(si) > 0 if and
only if a state si is essential; and the marginal probability measure Pc on Sc induced by P
(and hence P itself) are nonatomic.
Part (i) and (ii) state the well-known result in Debreu (1960) that the sure-thing principle
is equivalent to the existence of an additively decomposable representation, also known as
the state-dependent expected utility model. Part (iii) states the formal equivalence between
this model and the benchmarking procedure over a state space Ω = So×Sc. The proof of (iii)
runs in two steps. First, we “hijack” Debreu’s theorem to derive a benchmarking measure
P over the rectangles in So × Sc. Second, we show that the existence of a benchmarking
representation is equivalent to additive decomposability. By relying on Debreu’s result, the
proof of Theorem 1 adheres as much as possible to standard techniques in decision theory.
It is worthwhile to note that the benchmarking measure P induces a marginal probability
measure Po on the measurable space (So,Σo) which attaches strictly positive weights only
to essential events. Therefore, the benchmarking measure is consistent with the standard
interpretation that the agent has a subjective probability describing his beliefs over the
likelihoods of the (overt) events.
3.2 Independent benchmarking
For the measure representation approach over probability distributions, Segal (1989) shows
that we end up with the expected utility representation when the measure over epigraphs
can be written as the product of the two marginal measures. This strongly suggests that,
under the benchmarking approach, we should recover the standard (state-independent)
expected utility representation over acts when the probability measure P is the product of
the two marginal probability measures Po and Pc. Inspired by this, we call independent
benchmarking the case where stochastic independence between the acts and the benchmark
holds. As we show momentarily, under this assumption the benchmarking procedure is
formally equivalent to ranking acts by their expected utility. See Bordley and LiCalzi
(2000).
6We need an additional deﬁnition. A preference relation  satisﬁes tradeoﬀ consistency
if xAf ∼ yAg, wAf ∼ zAg, and xBh ∼ yBh0 imply wBh ∼ zBh0 for all outcomes x,y,w,z,
simple acts f,g,h,h0 and essential events A,B. Tradeoﬀ consistency requires that, when
preferences reveal that x compares to y as favorably as w compares to z on the essential
event A, this pattern stays unchanged over another essential event B.
The ﬁrst (and stronger) version of tradeoﬀ consistency was introduced in Wakker (1984).
K¨ obberling and Wakker (2003) thoroughly discusses alternative weaker formulations, includ-
ing the present one. For our purposes, the main advantage of tradeoﬀ consistency is that it
oﬀers a clean way to a characterization as close to Theorem 1 as possible. The next result
states that, under mild technical assumptions, an independent benchmarking representation
is possible if and only if preferences satisfy tradeoﬀ consistency.
Theorem 2 Suppose that So has at least three essential states. Then the following three
statements are equivalent,
(i) The weak order  is strictly monotone, continuous, and satisﬁes tradeoﬀ consistency.
(ii) There exist a continuous strictly increasing function U : X → [0,1] and a ﬁnitely





Moreover, P(si) > 0 if and only if a state si is essential.
(iii) The statement in Theorem 1.(iii) holds. Moreover, P = Po × Pc can be factored in the
product of the two marginal probability measures; i.e., stochastic independence holds.
The equivalence of (i) and (ii) is a minor variant of Corollary 10 in K¨ obberling and
Wakker (2003). The equivalence of (ii) and (iii) states the formal equivalence of independent
benchmarking and standard expected utility. Roughly speaking, the state independence of
the von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function U(x) in the expected utility model is
equivalent to the stochastic independence of the benchmark β from the acts in F in the
benchmarking procedure. An analogous result for preferences over probability distributions
appears in Castagnoli and LiCalzi (1996).
4 Benchmarking over an inﬁnite state space
Throughout this section, we assume that the overt space So is inﬁnite. We provide three
results, that rely on increasingly restrictive notions of continuity. Theorem 3 derives the
7benchmarking representation of Theorem 1 for simple acts over an inﬁnite state space. The-
orem 4 extends this representation to the set of all acts. Theorem 5 imposes the additional
restriction that the benchmarking measure be countably additive. These three results hold
in general for any space So but, when So is ﬁnite, they collapse to the same statement.
Thus, restricting attention to an inﬁnite state space So is necessary to avoid trivialities.
4.1 Simple continuity
We need an additional deﬁnition. A preference relation  is simply continuous if, for each
ﬁnite partition Π = {A1,...,An} ⊆ Σo of the state space So, it is continuous over the ﬁnite-
dimensional subspace of simple acts that are Π-measurable. A Π-measurable act f is of the
form f =
Pn
i=1 xi1(Ai). Therefore, simple continuity requires that for every (x1,...,xn) in









i=1 yi1(Ai)} are closed subsets of Rn in the Euclidean
topology. Simple continuity is equivalent to standard continuity of  when So is ﬁnite, and
in general it is substantially weaker than assuming continuity of  in the product topology.
The ﬁrst result states that, after exchanging simple continuity for standard continuity,
the benchmarking representation of Theorem 1 for arbitrary acts over a ﬁnite state space
holds for simple acts over an inﬁnite state space as well. Given a measurable space (So,Σo),
recall that an event A is an element of the algebra Σo. Moreover, given a probability measure
P over an algebra on So×Sc, denote by Po and Pc the marginal probability measures induced
on So and Sc, respectively.
Theorem 3 Suppose that So has at least three essential disjoint events. Then the following
three statements are equivalent.
(i) The weak order  is strictly monotone, simply continuous on Fs, and satisﬁes the sure-
thing principle on Fs.
(ii) There exist continuous functions UA : X → [0,1] for each event A that are strictly












(iii) There exist a (covert) measurable space (Sc,Σc), a ﬁnitely additive probability measure
P over the algebra A(Σo ×Σc) on So ×Sc, and an injective benchmark β : Sc → [a,b], such
that  on Fs is represented by
V (f) = P(f ≥ β).
8Moreover, Po(A) > 0 if and only if the event A is essential; and Pc on Sc (and hence P
itself) are nonatomic.
The equivalence of (i) and (ii) is a corollary of the additively decomposable represen-
tation in Debreu (1960) for ﬁnite state spaces, and appears as Proposition 3 in Wakker
and Zank (1999). We use (ii) as a useful shortcut to derive the benchmarking measure P
in (iii). The full proof of the equivalence between (ii) and (iii) is in Appendix B, but we
oﬀer hereafter a compact description. The measure-theoretic approach in the proof applies
unchanged to the derivation of the next two results.
An act f is a function from So in X = [a,b]. Identify each simple act f with its subgraph
ˆ f = {(s,x) ∈ So × [a,b] : a ≤ x ≤ f(s)}. There is an obvious 1-1 onto mapping between
the set Fs of simple acts and the set G0 of their subgraphs. Since G0 is closed with respect
to ﬁnite unions and ﬁnite intersections, it is a lattice. A functional V on Fs deﬁnes a
set function m on the lattice G0. In particular, it is possible to choose a version of the
functional V in Theorem 3.(ii) that generates a set function m which is grounded, positive,
and strongly additive on the lattice G = G0 ∪ {∅}. This set function m uniquely extends to
a measure m0 on the semialgebra S(G) generated by G. This semialgebra coincides with the
product semialgebra Σo ×Σc and thus m0 can be uniquely extended to a (ﬁnitely additive)
probability measure µ on the algebra A(Σo × Σc) on So × Sc generated by Σo × Σc.
This method of proof works for any “overt” state space So given as a primitive of the
model. On the other hand, we enjoy some freedom in the choice of the “covert” measurable
space (Sc,Σc) that is derived as part of the representation. For instance, the measurable
space (Sc,Σc) may be replaced with another measurable space (Sc
1,Σc
1) if there exists a 1-1
and (Σc
1,Σc)-measurable transformation between Σc
1 and Σc.
Our derivation of the benchmarking measure makes the minimal assumption that the
“covert” state space Sc is the interval [a,b] itself. For consistency, in this section we keep the
size of the corresponding algebra Σc as small as possible and, diﬀerently from the proof of
Theorem 1, we do not assume upfront that Σc is the Borel σ-algebra B([a,b]). This is without
loss of generality, because it is always possible to complete Σc into the σ-algebra B([a,b])
and extend the (nonatomic) marginal probability measure Pc on Σc to a countably additive
measure on B([a,b]). But we feel that these manipulations of the “covert” measurable space
are not fundamental for the argument.
4.2 Supnorm continuity
In this section, we extend the benchmarking representation of Theorem 3 from simple acts
to all acts. We need a few deﬁnitions. The preference relation  on the set F of all acts is
supnorm continuous if, for each act f, the upper level set {g : g  f,g ∈ F} and the lower
9level set {g : f  g,g ∈ F} are closed subsets in the topology induced by the supnorm
||f|| = sups |f(s)|. Supnorm continuity is equivalent to standard continuity of  when So
is ﬁnite, and it implies simple continuity.
A functional V : F → R is additively decomposable over disjoint events if for each event
A there exists a functional UA on the set FA of restrictions fA of an act f to A such that,
for each ﬁnite partition {A1,...,An} of So, V (f) =
Pn
i=1 UAi(fAi). The second result
states that, after exchanging supnorm continuity for simple continuity, the benchmarking
representation of Theorem 3.(iii) extends from the set Fs of the simple acts to the set F of
all acts. For symmetry and ease of comparison, we state in (ii) the analog of Theorem 3.(ii)
asserting the existence of a representing functional that is additively decomposable over
disjoint events.
Theorem 4 Suppose that So has at least three essential disjoint events. Then the following
three statements are equivalent.
(i) The weak order  is strictly monotone, supnorm continuous on F, and satisﬁes the
sure-thing principle on Fs.
(ii) There exist supnorm continuous functions UA : FA → [0,1] for each event A that are






for each ﬁnite partition {A1,...,An} of events.
(iii) There exist a (covert) measurable space (Sc,Σc), a ﬁnitely additive probability measure
P over an algebra A on So × Sc which includes A(Σo × Σc), and an injective benchmark
β : Sc → [a,b], such that  on F is represented by
V (f) = P(f ≥ β).
Moreover, Po(A) > 0 if and only if the event A is essential; and Pc on Sc (and hence P
itself) are nonatomic.
The equivalence of (i) and (ii) appears as Theorem 11 in Wakker and Zank (1999).
Their result establishes the existence of a representing functional for all acts, but derives
an explicit functional form only over simple acts. Part (iii), on the other hand, provides an
explicit representing functional for all acts. In this respect, the benchmarking procedure
seems easier to apprehend.
It should be noted that our proof for the equivalence of (i) and (iii) does not rely
on the representation in (ii). We obtain (iii) by applying the Jordan extension technique
10(described in Appendix A) to the probability measure derived in Theorem 3. As a result,
the benchmarking measure in Theorem 4.(iii) is the maximally unique extension of the
ﬁnitely additive probability measure on simple acts obtained in Theorem 3.
4.3 Pointwise continuity
In this section, we provide a diﬀerent extension of the benchmarking representation of
Theorem 3 from simple acts to all acts. The extension in Theorem 4 is based on supnorm
continuity and gives a ﬁnitely additive benchmarking measure for all acts in F. The current
extension is based on a stronger pointwise continuity assumption and delivers a countably
additive benchmarking measure for all acts in F.
We need a few additional deﬁnitions. A sequence {fn} of acts converges pointwise to
another act f if limn→∞ fn(s) = f(s) for any state s. The preference relation  on the set
F of all acts is pointwise continuous if, for any sequence {fn} converging pointwise to f
and for any act g, f  g implies fn  g for n greater than some N and, similarly, g  f
implies g  fn for n greater than some N. Pointwise continuity is equivalent to standard
continuity of  when So is ﬁnite, and it implies supnorm continuity.
The third result states that, after exchanging pointwise continuity for supnorm con-
tinuity, the benchmarking measure of Theorem 4.(iii) becomes countably additive. For
symmetry and ease of comparison, we state in (ii) the analog of Theorem 4.(ii) asserting
the existence of a representing functional which can be written as an integral with respect
to a countably additive measure.
Theorem 5 Suppose that So has at least three essential disjoint events. Then the following
three statements are equivalent.
(i) The weak order  is strictly monotone, pointwise continuous on F, and satisﬁes the
sure-thing principle on Fs.
(ii) There exist a countably additive probability measure Po on So and strictly increasing




(iii) There exist a (covert) measurable space (Sc,Σc), a countably additive probability mea-
sure P over the σ-algebra σA(Σo×Σc) on So×Sc, and an injective benchmark β : Sc → [a,b],
such that  on F is represented by
V (f) = P(f ≥ β).
Moreover, Po(A) > 0 if and only if the event A is essential; and Pc on Sc (and hence P
itself) are nonatomic.
11The equivalence of (i) and (ii) appears as Theorem 12 in Wakker and Zank (1999),
but our proof is independent of it. We obtain (iii) by applying the Lebesgue extension
technique (described in Appendix A) to the probability measure derived in Theorem 3.
Using an argument similar to Kindler (1983), we show that under pointwise continuity the
benchmarking measure on the semialgebra generated by the subgraphs of simple acts is
countably additive. Then the Lebesgue extension provides a countably additive measure
over the σ-algebra generated by the semialgebra. As a result, the benchmarking measure
in Theorem 5 is the maximally unique extension of the (now, countably) additive measure
on simple acts obtained in Theorem 3.
4.4 Independent benchmarking
When the state space is inﬁnite, the link between tradeoﬀ consistency and the factorization
of the benchmarking measure into the product of its marginals holds unchanged. The next
result modiﬁes the general benchmarking representation for preferences over simple acts of
Theorem 3 into the analog of the independent benchmarking representation of Theorem 2.
Theorem 6 Suppose that So has at least three essential disjoint events. Then the following
three statements are equivalent.
(i) The weak order  is strictly monotone, simply continuous on Fs, and satisﬁes tradeoﬀ
consistency on Fs.
(ii) There exist a continuous strictly increasing function U : X → [0,1] and a ﬁnitely











Moreover, P(A) > 0 if and only if the event A is essential.
(iii) The statement in Theorem 3.(iii) holds. Moreover, P = Po × Pc can be factored in the
product of the two marginal probability measures; i.e., stochastic independence holds.
The same variation holds for Theorems 4 and 5. This is an immediate corollary of the
preceding result, because the representations in Theorems 4 and 5 are based on extensions
of a strongly additive set function m initially deﬁned over the (augmented) lattice G of the
subgraphs of the simple acts. When Theorem 6 holds and the measure induced by m over
the semialgebra generated by G decomposes in a product measure, so do its extensions as
well.
12Appendices
A Extensions of measures
A typical problem in measure theory is to extend a measure deﬁned on a collection C1 of
sets to a larger collection C2 ⊃ C1. There is a well-known hierarchy of minimal extension
theorems; see for instance Theorem 3.5.1 in Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao (1983). We
collect here the four extension theorems used in this paper. Throughout this section, we
use the shorter qualiﬁcations “additive” and “σ-additive” instead of “ﬁnitely additive” and
“countably additive”.
First, suppose that L is a lattice on S and m is a grounded, positive, and strongly
additive set function on L. Let S(L) be the smallest semialgebra on S containing L; then
there exists a unique additive measure µ on S(L) which is an extension of m from L to
S(L). Second, suppose that S is a semialgebra on S and m is an additive measure on S.
Let A(S) be the smallest algebra on S containing S; then there exists a unique additive
measure µ on A(S) which is an extension of m from S to A(S). The next two extension
results deal with non-minimal extensions. Their diﬀerence is at the heart of our results,
so we describe them less succinctly. See Section 7.27 in Kolmogorov and Fomin (1970) for
more details.
Given an algebra A on S and an additive measure m on A, a subset A of S is Jordan
measurable, or J-measurable for short, if for any ε > 0 there exist two sets A1,A2 in A such
that A1 ⊆ A ⊆ A2 and m(A2 \ A1) < ε. The collection J(A) of all J-measurable sets is
an algebra that contains the original algebra; that is, A ⊆ J(A). For an arbitrary subset
A of S, deﬁne its outer measure by µ∗(A) = inf {m(B) : B ⊇ A,B ∈ A} and its inner
measure by µ∗(A) = sup{m(B) : B ⊆ A,B ∈ A}. Then µ∗(A) ≤ µ∗(A) for any A ⊆ S,
with equality holding if and only if A is J-measurable. Moreover, µ∗ is an additive measure
on J(A). Since µ∗(A) = m(A) for any A in A, µ∗ is called the Jordan extension of m from
A to J(A).
The Jordan extension µ∗ of an additive measure m on an algebra A is its unique additive
extension to the algebra J(A), in the following sense. A subset A of S is a set of uniqueness
for an additive measure m if: 1) there is an additive extension of m deﬁned on A; and
2) when µ1,µ2 are two such extensions, then µ1(A) = µ2(A). The collection of sets of
uniqueness for an additive measure m on the algebra A coincides with the algebra J(A)
of the J-measurable sets. The additive extension of m to a collection larger than J(A) is
no longer unique. Hence, the Jordan extension is the maximally unique extension of an
additive measure on the algebra A.
Given a semialgebra S on S and a σ-additive (and ﬁnite) measure m on S, deﬁne the











A subset A of S is Lebesgue measurable, or L-measurable for short, if µ(A∩B)+µ(Ac∩B) =
m(B) for any B in S. The collection L(S) of all L-measurable sets is a σ-algebra which
contains the original semialgebra; that is, S ⊆ L(S). Since µ is a σ-additive measure on
L(S) and µ(A) = m(A) for any A in S, µ is called the Lebesgue extension of m from S to
the σ-algebra L(S).
The Lebesgue extension µ of a σ-additive measure m on a semialgebra S is its unique
σ-additive extension to the σ-algebra L(S), in the following sense. A subset A of S is a set of
σ-uniqueness for a σ-additive measure m if: 1) there is a σ-additive extension of m deﬁned
on A; and 2) when µ1,µ2 are two such extensions, then µ1(A) = µ2(A). The collection of
sets of σ-uniqueness for a σ-additive measure m on the semialgebra S coincides with the
σ-algebra L(S) of the L-measurable sets. Hence, the Lebesgue extension is the maximally
unique extension of a σ-additive measure on the semialgebra S. Finally, we note that any
J-measurable set A is also L-measurable and µ∗(A) = µ(A). Thus, J[A(S)] ⊆ L(S) and
the Jordan extension of a σ-additive measure m on a semialgebra S is also σ-additive.
B Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. The equivalence of (i) and (ii) is Theorem 3 in Debreu (1960),
where it is also shown that another functional W(f) =
P
i Wi(f(si)) represents  if and
only if there exist real numbers α1,...αn and a strictly positive γ such that Wi = αi +γUi
for all i, implying that W =
P
i αi + γV .
We prove that (ii) implies (iii). Replacing (if necessary) Ui(x) with Ui(x)−Ui(a), assume
Ui(a) = 0 for all i. Hence, V (a) = 0; without loss of generality, let V (b) = 1. For each
essential state si, Ui(x) is continuous, strictly increasing and bounded above by V (b) = 1.
Therefore, it induces a unique (countably additive and) strictly positive measure µi on
the Borel σ-algebra B([a,b]). Now µi generates a unique (countably additive and) strictly
positive measure νi on (So×[a,b],Σo×B([a,b]) deﬁned by νi(A) = µi(A∩({si}×[a,b])). The
abuse in notation is justiﬁed by the identiﬁcation of B([a,b]) with {si} × B([a,b]). Clearly,
the measure νi is nonatomic: if (sj,x)6∈{si} × [a,b], then νi({(sj,x)}) = 0; else, if sj = si,
then
νi({(sj,x)}) = νi({si} × {x}) = µi({x}) = Ui(x) − lim
y↑x
Ui(y) = 0
by continuity of Ui. On the other hand, for each null state si, Ui(x) is constant and by a
14similar construction induces a null measure. Since
n X
i=1







it follows that P =
P
i µi is a nonatomic (and ﬁnitely additive) probability measure on
(So × [a,b],Σo × B([a,b])). Finally, choose Sc = [a,b] and deﬁne the random variable
β(s) = s to obtain
P(f ≥ β) = P











































We prove that (iii) implies (ii). Since
P(f ≥ β) = P








{(so,sc) ∈ {si} × Sc : β(sc) ≤ f(si)}

,
deﬁne for each i = 1,...,n
Ui(t) = P

{(so,sc) ∈ {si} × Sc : β(sc) ≤ t}

and V (f) =
P
i Ui(f(si)). Then V (f) represents . Moreover, Ui(t) is strictly increasing
(respectively, constant) if and only if the state Si is essential (null). It remains to show
that Ui is continuous. This follows because the measure on (Sc,Σc) deﬁned by µi(A) =
P({si} × A) is nonatomic and Ui(t) = µi (sc∈Sc : β(s) ≤ t) is the distribution function of
an injective random variable with respect to a nonatomic measure. 2
Proof of Theorem 2. The equivalence of (i) and (ii) follows from Lemma 24 and Corollary
10 in K¨ obberling and Wakker (2003), with the addition that the strict monotonicity of 
implies that U is strictly increasing. The utility function U is unique up to a strictly
increasing aﬃne transformation and the probability measure P is uniquely determined.
15We prove that (ii) implies (iii). Deﬁne Sc = [a,b] and let Σc be the Borel σ-algebra
B([a,b]). Assume without loss of generality U(a) = 0 and U(b) = 1. Since U is continuous
and strictly increasing, it is the distribution function of a random variable β(s) = s which
induces a unique strictly positive and countably additive measure Pc on Σc.
Deﬁne the ﬁnitely additive probability measure Po = P on (So,Σo). Finally, let P =




P(f ≥ β) = P

























The proof that (iii) implies (ii) is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1 and follows by
reading the equalities backward. 2
Proof of Theorem 3. The implication from (i) to (ii) is Proposition 3 in Wakker and Zank





represents  on Fs if and only if there exist real numbers αA for each event A in Σo and a
strictly positive γ such that WA = αA + γUA for all A in Σo with αA∪B = αA + αB for all
disjoint events, implying that W = αSo + γV . The implication from (ii) to (i) is obvious.
The proof that (iii) implies (ii) is analogous to that one given for Theorem 1, so we
only prove that (ii) implies (iii). Replacing (if necessary) UA(x) with UA(x) − UA(a) for
any event A, assume UA(a) = 0 for all i. Hence, V (a) = 0; without loss of generality, let
V (b) = 1. Recall that an act f is a function from So in X = [a,b]. Identify each simple
act f in Fs with its (truncated) subgraph ˆ f = {(s,x) ∈ So × [a,b] : a ≤ x ≤ f(s)}. There
is an obvious 1-1 onto mapping between the set Fs of simple acts and the set G0 of their
subgraphs.
Lemma B.1 The set G0 of subgraphs of simple functions is a lattice.
Proof: Clearly, S = ˆ b ∈ G0. Now, let ˆ f and ˆ g be the subgraphs of two simple acts
f =
Pn
i=1 xi1(Ai) and g =
Pm
i=1 yi1(Bi). We need to show that ˆ f ∪ ˆ g and ˆ f ∩ ˆ g are also
subgraphs of simple functions. Let Π = {C1,...,Ck} be the coarsest common reﬁnement of





i=1 yi1(Ci) as simple functions on Π. But then ˆ f ∪ ˆ g is the subgraph of the
simple function (f ∨g) =
Pk
i=1 (xi ∨ yi)1(Ci). Similarly, ˆ f ∩ ˆ g is the subgraph of (f ∧g) =
Pk
i=1 (xi ∧ yi)1(Ci). 
The functional V on Fs deﬁnes a set function m on the lattice G0 by m( ˆ f) = V (f).
Note that m(ˆ a) = V (a) = 0 and m(ˆ b) = V (b) = 1.
Lemma B.2 The set function m on the lattice G0 is strongly additive.
Proof: Let ˆ f and ˆ g be the subgraphs of two simple acts f =
Pn
i=1 xi1(Ai) and g =
Pm
i=1 yi1(Bi). We need to show that m( ˆ f) + m(ˆ g) = m( ˆ f ∪ ˆ g) + m( ˆ f ∩ ˆ g). Replacing
{A1,...,An} and {B1,...,Bm} with their coarsest common reﬁnement {C1,...,Ck}, we
can assume that f =
Pk
i=1 xi1(Ci) and g =
Pk
i=1 yi1(Ci). Then















= V (f ∨ g) + V (f ∧ g)
= m( ˆ f ∪ ˆ g) + m( ˆ f ∩ ˆ g).

The set function m on the lattice G0 trivially extends to the augmented lattice G =
G0
S
{∅} by setting m(∅) = 0. Clearly, the set function m on the lattice G is grounded, pos-
itive, and strongly additive and thus, by Theorem 3.5.1.(iii) in Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara
Rao (1983), it has a unique extension to a ﬁnitely additive and positive measure m0 on
the semialgebra S(G) = {A \ B : A,B ∈ G,B ⊆ A} generated by G. This unique extension
obtains by deﬁning m0(A \ B) = m(A) − m(B) for any A,B in G with B ⊆ A.
By Theorem 3.5.1.(ii) in Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao (1983), the measure m0 has
a unique extension to a ﬁnitely additive and positive measure µ on the algebra A[S(G)] =
{
Sn
i=1 Ci : Ci ∈ S, Ci
T
Cj = ∅ for i 6= j} generated by S(G). This unique extension ob-




i=1 m0(Ci) for any ﬁnite union of disjoint sets C1,...,Cn
from S(G).
Since µ(ˆ b) = m(ˆ b) = 1, µ is a (ﬁnitely additive) probability measure on the algebra
A[S(G)]. The benchmarking measure can be obtained from µ.
Lemma B.3 The ﬁnitely additive probability measure µ is a benchmarking measure.
17Proof: Choose Sc = [a,b] and let Σc be the semialgebra formed by all the clopen intervals
(y,x] and all the closed intervals [a,x] in [a,b]. Then the product semialgebra Σo × Σc
coincides with S(G) and thus µ deﬁnes a ﬁnitely additive probability measure P on the
algebra A(Σo × Σc) on So × Sc. Choosing β(s) = s as benchmark, we have P(f ≥ β) =
P

{(so,sc) ∈ So × Sc : f(so) ≥ β(sc)}

= m( ˆ f) and thus P is a benchmarking measure. 
Finally, consider the two marginal probability measures induced by P. First, since UA
is strictly increasing if the event A in Σo is essential and constant otherwise, it follows
that Po(A) = m

b1(A) + a1(So \ A)

= UA(b) is strictly greater than UA(a) = 0 when
A is essential, and it is equal to UA(a) = 0 otherwise. Second, note that Pc ((y,x]) =
USo(x) − USo(y) for y < x; since, USo is continuous and strictly increasing, for y < x we
have Pc ((y,x]) > 0 and Pc ((y,x]) ↓ 0 as y ↑ x; therefore, Pc is nonatomic. This concludes
the proof of Theorem 3. 2
Proof of Theorem 4. The equivalence of (i) and (ii) is Theorem 11 in Wakker and Zank
(1999). The proof that (iii) implies (i) is straightforward. We only prove that (i) implies
(iii).
The supnorm continuity of the preference relation implies its simple continuity. There-
fore, the assumptions in Theorem 3.(i) are satisﬁed and we can replicate its proof (up to just
before Lemma B.3) to derive the existence of a ﬁnitely additive measure µ on the algebra
A = A[S(G)] generated by S(G).
The algebra A is the smallest algebra generated by G. We uniquely extend µ to a
measure µJ on the (possibly) larger algebra AJ of the J-measurable sets using the Jordan
extension described in Appendix A. Under the supnorm continuity of , the subgraph ˆ f of
an arbitrary act f in F is J-measurable.
Lemma B.4 The subgraph ˆ f of any act f is J-measurable.
Proof: The set Fs of simple functions is supnorm dense in F. Therefore, for any act f in
F, we can ﬁnd two sequences of simple acts {gi} and {hi} such that gi and hi converge in
supnorm to f with gi(s) ≤ gi+1(s) ≤ f(s) ≤ hi+1(s) ≤ h(s) for any state s in So. Recall from
Appendix A the deﬁnitions of inner and outer measure. Then µ(ˆ gi) ≤ µ∗( ˆ f) ≤ µ∗( ˆ f) ≤ µ(ˆ hi)
for all i. By supnorm continuity, µ(ˆ hi)−µ(ˆ gi) ↓ 0. Therefore, µ∗( ˆ f) = µ∗( ˆ f) and hence the
subgraph ˆ f of any act f is J-measurable. 
This J-measurability implies that the Jordan extension µJ of µ to AJ ⊇ A is well deﬁned
for the subgraph ˆ f of any act f in F. The rest of the proof goes on as for Theorem 3. In
particular, apply Lemma B.3 to µJ on AJ to obtain the benchmarking measure. This
concludes the proof of Theorem 4. 2
18Proof of Theorem 5. The equivalence of (i) and (ii) is Theorem 12 in Wakker and Zank
(1999). The proof that (iii) implies (i) is straightforward. We only prove that (i) implies
(iii).
The pointwise continuity of the preference relation implies its simple continuity. There-
fore, the assumptions in Theorem 3.(i) are satisﬁed and we can replicate its proof (up to
right after Lemma B.2) to derive the existence of a ﬁnitely additive measure µ on the semi-
algebra S(G) = {A \ B : A,B ∈ G,B ⊆ A} generated by the lattice of the subgraphs of the
simple acts in Fs, augmented with the empty set. For any pair of simple acts f ≤ g, deﬁne
the set (f,g] = {(so,sc) ∈ So×Sc : f(so) < sc ≤ g(so)}; the set [f,g] is deﬁned analogously.
Clearly, ˆ g \ ˆ f = (f,g] and therefore the semialgebra S(G) is formed by the collection of all
sets (f,g] and [a,f], for a ≤ f ≤ g in Fs. Under the pointwise continuity of , the measure
µ on the semialgebra S(G) is countably additive.
Lemma B.5 The measure µ on the semialgebra S(G) is countably additive.
Proof: For f ≤ g in Fs, suppose without loss of generality that (f,g] =
S
n(fn,gn] can
be written as a countable union of disjoint sets (fn,gn], where fn,gn are simple acts for
all n. We need to show that µ((f,g]) =
P
n µ((fn,gn]). For any so in So, (f(so),g(so)] =
S
n(fn(so),gn(so)]. Since the length of real-valued intervals is countably additive, it follows
that g(so)−f(so) =
P
n [gn(so) − fn(so)] for any so. Deﬁne hn = a+[g − f −
Pn
i=1 (gi − fi)].
Then hn ∈ Fs for all n and hn pointwise converges to a. By pointwise continuity, µ(ˆ hn) ↓
µ(ˆ a) = 0 and thus µ((f,g]) =
P
n µ((fn,gn]). 
Since µ(ˆ b) = m(ˆ b) = 1, µ is ﬁnite. Therefore, this countable additivity implies that
we can uniquely extend µ from the semialgebra S(G) to a measure µL on the σ-algebra
σA(Σ0×Σc) using the Lebesgue extension described in Appendix A. Any J-measurable set
is also L-measurable and thus the Lebesgue extension µL is a countably additive measure
on σA(Σ0 × Σc) ⊇ AJ ⊇ S(G) such that µL(A) = µ(A) for any event A in the semialgebra
S(G). The proof concludes by applying Lemma B.3 to µL on σA(Σ0 × Σc). 2
Proof of Theorem 6. The proof of the equivalence of (i) and (ii) is sketched in Section 5.1
of K¨ obberling and Wakker (2003) and requires a trivial modiﬁcation of the argument given
in Section 5.3 of Wakker (1989). The proof that (ii) implies (iii) is formally identical to the
corresponding argument in Theorem 3, except for that the right-hand term in the deﬁnition
m( ˆ f) = V (f) is a diﬀerent functional and thus a single normalization U(a) = 0 and U(b) = 1
suﬃces. The proof that (iii) implies (ii) is analogous to that one given for Theorem 2. 2
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